Nature of the Wife\u27s Interst During the Existence of the Community by Rountree, Gordon E.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 1
Symposium Issue: Louisiana Legislation of 1964
December 1964
Nature of the Wife's Interst During the Existence of
the Community
Gordon E. Rountree
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Gordon E. Rountree, Nature of the Wife's Interst During the Existence of the Community, 25 La. L. Rev. (1964)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol25/iss1/20
COMMENTS
Even under the current law, it would seem that deposits in
a joint account of a married couple would be presumed to be
community property. 267 Thus separate creditors of the wife
cannot rely on the fact that funds have been deposited in such
a joint account, and their claims may be defeated by a showing
that the funds represent community property, which cannot be
seized for her debts.
268
It is settled that joint deposits with survivorship provisions
do not affect the requirements for a valid donation, either inter
vivos or mortis causa.
269
Kenneth D. McCoy, Jr.
NATURE OF THE WIFE'S INTEREST DURING THE
EXISTENCE OF THE COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
Characterization of the exact nature of the wife's interest
during the existence of the community has proved to be an
arduous task. In Arnett v. Reade, Justice Holmes stated: "It
is not necessary to go very deeply into the precise nature of
the wife's interest during the marriage. The discussion has fed
the flame of juridical controversy for many years."' In numer-
ous attempts to settle the matter, jurists have described the
wife's interest as residuary, inchoate, dormant, as a hope or
expectancy, and as absolute ownership of one-half of the com-
without the authorization of her husband... The bank, under the terms of
the deposit, was obligated to account for the fund to plaintiff's wife as well as
to plaintiff." Id. at 975-76, 126 So. at 443. Accord, Clingman v. Devonian Oil
Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1957).
LeRosen has subsequently been overruled on another point, Jones v. Southern
Natural Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 34 (1948), but would appear to stand
on the question of payment to joint accounts. It is significant, however, that
the provisions discussed in the text at notes 261-263 supra were enacted subse-
quent to LeRosen and seem to negate the assumption in LeRosen that the de-
positary is obligated to account to all of the joint depositors. See Note, 12
Tur. L. REV. 465, 466 (1938).
LeRosen and Clingman are severely criticized in Daggett, Policy Questions
on Marital Property Law in Louisiana, 14 LA. L. REV. 528, 534 (1954).
267. Lagle v. Marchand's Estate, 129 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
268. Geo. L. Ducros Tile Co. v. Ruth, 137 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
269. Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930) ; of. Succession of
Mulqueeny, 156 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d
234.
1. 220 U.S. 311, 319 (1911).
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munity during its existence. Among other things, analogies have
been made to ownership in indivision, partnership, usufruct,
and trust. It appears that in the Louisiana community prop-
erty system, the choice has been narrowed to a consideration
of two possibilities. Is the wife to be considered an owner in
indivision of one-half of the community during its existence, or
does she have merely a hope or expectancy which materializes
into absolute ownership only after the community has been dis-
solved? Rather than attempt to classify the nature of the wife's
interest under any single label or theory, the purpose of this
Comment is to determine the present state of law in Louisiana.
The major portion examines the pertinent code provisions and
jurisprudence, while the latter portion surveys the practical
effects of both viewpoints.
HISTORY
Since the Louisiana community property system is largely




It is generally accepted that the community property system
originated with the Germans.3 Later, the Germanic customary
law became the customary law of Northern France.4 Although
the French customs were by no means uniform prior to the
French Civil Code of 1804, the French writers generally agreed
that the wife's interest during the community was a mere
expectancy or benefit of survivorship.5 Dumoulin explained that
2. See generally Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 78 (1964).
3. Cole's Widow v. His Executors, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 41, 48 (La. 1828), 3
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE, LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 891 (1959); McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 9
(2d ed. 1925) ; Daggett, A Comparison of the German Community System With
That of Louisiana, 4 TuL. L. REV. 27 (1929) ; Daggett, The Modern Problem
of the Nature of the Wife's Interest in Community Property -A Comparative
Study, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 569 (1931).
4. Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest in
Community Property-A Comparative Study, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 570
(1931).
5. See references to and translations of early commentators in Garrozi v.
Dastas, 204 U.S. 64, 79 (1907). In Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188, 191
(1832) the court stated: "We are aware the principles here recognised do not
correspond with the doctrines taught by the highest authorities in the French
law, by Dumoulin, Pothier. . . . They hold that the wife has no right whatever,
until the marriage is dissolved, or the community otherwise terminates. That
she has nothing but a mere hope or expectancy." See also 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL
LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW
[Vol. XXV
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the wife was not a co-owner during her husband's life, but she
only hoped to become one.0 In accord, Pothier stated the hus-
band could "abuse his power and let the whole common estate
deteriorate or become a total loss, without any obligation to
indemnify his wife."
'7
With the adoption of the French Civil Code came a diversity
of opinions. Toullier, adhering to the earlier view, concluded
that the wife had no tangible interest in the community until
its dissolution." Troplong spoke of the rights of the wife as
being "dormant" during the marriage. He said "the wife is like
a silent partner, whose rights arise and reveal themselves when
the partnership ceases." 9 On the other hand, the majority of
the later commentators seem to support the ownership ap-
proach.10 For example, Planiol asserted that the wife was a
"joint owner by halves."" Continuing, he declared that "the
spouses have always been considered co-owners, with the hus-
band being the head and master of the common property.'
12
Manifestly, the French commentators are not in accord regard-
ing the nature of the wife's interest prior to dissolution of the
community.
Spanish
The Spanish authorities appear as unhelpful as the French.
Manresa viewed the "proprietorship" of the wife as "not
nominal or theoretical, but real and effective."' 18 In accord is
Matienzo, who declared that "ownership and possession of a
moiety of the property acquired during marriage passes auto-
matically to the wife without delivery and the wife is owner
INSTITUTE) noS. 892, 898 (1959) ; Jackson, Taxation of Community Property:
The Wiener Case, 18 TUL. L. REV. 525, 527 (1944).
6. Duinoulin, quoted in 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 898 (1959).
7. Pothier, quoted in 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANS-
LATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1018 (1959).
8. 12 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS no 75 (1846).
9. 2 TROPLONG, LE DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUt, DU CONTRAT DE MARIAGE no 855
(1850).
10. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 905, 1037 (1959); 8 AUBRY ET
RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 505 (5th ed. 1916); 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE
TRAITA DE DROIT CIVIL, DU CONTRAT DE MARIAGE no 247 (2d ed. 1901).
11. 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1037 (1959).
12. Id. no. 905.
13. Manresa, quoted in Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the
Wife's Interest in Community Property-A Comparative Study, 19 CALIF. L.
REV. 567, 572 (1931).
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even during the marriage of the share which belongs to her."14
On the other hand, both Azevedo and Gutierrez characterized
the wife's interest as "constructive" ownership. 15 Azevedo added
that the wife's interest was "revocable" during the community,' 6
while both agreed that her "constructive" ownership does not
become absolute or "actual" ownership until dissolution of the
community. 1" Similarily, Febrero wrote:
"To the married woman is imparted and transferred by
usage and legal authority the dominion and possession,
revocable and fictitious, of the one-half of the property
which during the marriage she gains and acquires with her
husband; but after he dies, the same passes to her irrevo-
cably and effectively, so that, after his death, she becomes
the absolute owner in possession and property of the one-
half which he leaves in the manner prescribed by law be-
tween conventional partners."' 8 (Emphasis added.)
However, like the French, it appears that the ownership ap-
proach has emerged as the dominant position in Spanish law.19
The above survey indicates that a solution to the problem by
way of historical investigation is unlikely. It is conceivable
that one could find historical support for almost any theory
imaginable concerning the nature of the wife's interest. Dag-
gett states that "in this maze of ancient statutes and learned
annotations, anything and nothing may be proved about as
elusive a thing as the wife's interest in the community."2 0
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to dismiss the search into
the past as being inconclusive. It seems the wife's interest in
the community has not remained constant but has varied from
14. MATIENZO, COMMENTARIA (1597), transl. in ROBBINS, COMMUNITY PROP-
ERTY LAWS 66 (1940) [hereinafter cited as MATIENZO with page reference to
ROBBINS transl.].
15. AZEVEDO, COMENTARIORUM IURIS CIVILIS IN HISPANIAR REGIAS (1597),
transl. in BOBBINS, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS 148 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as AZEVEDO with page reference to BOBBINS trans].] ; GUTIERREZ, PRACTICARUM
QUESTIONUM CIRCA LEGES REGIAS HISPANIAE (1606), transl. in ROBBINS, COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY LAWS 223 (1940) [hereinafter cited as GUTIERREZ with page
reference to ROBBINS transi.].
16. AZEVEDO 148.
17. AZEVEDO 149; GUTIERREZ 223.
18. Febrero, quoted in Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the
Wife's Interest in Community Property-A Comparative Study, 19 CALIF. L.
REV. 567, 571 (1931).
19. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 97 (1943).
20. Daggett, The Modern Problem of tMe Nature of the Wife's Interest in




time to time and place to place. Historical survey reveals that
the early theories generally depict the wife's interest as being
no greater than a benefit of survivorship or a hope. On the
other hand, it appears that the trend in later times has moved
away from the expectancy theory and more toward some type
of ownership theory.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Title VI of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code is devoted
to the subject of community property. The Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure and other later legislation include provisions
pertaining to community property law. While no code article
or other statutory provision specifically defines the nature of
the wife's interest, the Civil Code, supplemented by later stat-
utes, includes provisions concerning the nature of the wife's
interest during the existence of the community.
Expectancy Theory
Statutory support of the expectancy theory can be divided
into three main groups. First, article 2404 of the Civil Code
gives the husband unquestioned control over the community:
"The husband is head and master of the partnership or commu-
nity of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the reve-
nues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous
title, without the consent and permission of his wife."21 The
corresponding article in the 1808 Code provided that "the hus-
band is the head and master of the partnership or community
of gains; he administers said effects; disposes of the revenues
which they produce, and may sell and even give away the same
without the consent and permission of his wife, because she has
no sort of right in them until her husband is dead. ' 22 (Emphasis
added.) The legislative omission of the last portion of the
article from its 182528 and 187024 counterparts affords an op-
portunity for speculation. It is conceivable that the omission
indicates legislative intent to give the wife something more
than a hope or expectancy during the community. On the other
hand, one might say the omission merely reopened the question
for further consideration. Article 686 of the Louisiana Code
21. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2404 (1870).
22. LA. CIVIL CODE p. 336, art. 66 (1808).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2373 (1825).
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
1964] 163 -
'164 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXV
of Civil Procedure fully supports the spirit of article 2404 by
-designating the husband as the proper party to represent com-
munity interests in court.25 Article 695 of the same Code allows
the wife to act as agent of the community, but only "when
specially authorized to do so by her husband. ' 28  R.S. 9:291
indirectly supports article 2404 by not providing the wife with
a cause of action against her husband for an accounting of
community funds during the community.
27
The courts have upheld the validity of article 2404 by 'con-
sistently holding that the wife's sale or mortgage of community
immovables without the husband's consent is an absolute nul-
lity.28 Similarly, in support of article 2404, the courts have fre-
quently placed the wife in the category of a third person with
respect to her husband's actions concerning community prop-
erty.29 Cases involving the husband's lease agreements are
notable examples: when the husband leases property, the wife
is considered a third party to the agreement. 30 This rule be-
comes particularly significant when the lessee's wife suffers per-
sonal injury by some vice or defect in the premises. She has no
25. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 686 (1960) : "The husband is the
proper plaintiff, during the existence of the marital community, to sue to enforce
a right of the community." Article 686 is a codification of prior jurisprudence
with one statutory exception, LA. R.S. 7:51 (1950) : "The holder of a negotiable
instrument may sue thereon in his own name; and payment to him in due course
discharges the instrument." This exception to the rule that the husband is the
proper plaintiff was applied in Van Horn v. Vining, 133 So. 2d 901 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1961), where the court allowed a married woman named as payee of a
check given for her personal services to sue on the dishonored check. Since the
services were performed during the community, her earnings were community
property. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
26. Id. art. 695.
27. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1963): "As long as the marriage continues and
the spouses are not separated judicially a married woman may not sue her hus-
band except for: (1) A separation of property; (2) The restitution and enjoy-
ment of her paraphernal property; (3) A separation from bed and board; or
(4) A divorce."
28. Angichido v. Cerami, 217 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Roccaforte v. Barbin,
212 La. 69, 31 So. 2d 521 (1947) ; Robinson v. Marks, 211 La. 452, 30 So. 2d
200 (1947) ; Bywater v. Enderle, 175 La. 1098, 145 So. 118 (1932) ; Preston
v. Humphreys, 5 Rob. 299 (La. 1843) ; Liberal Finance Corp. v. Washington,
62 So. 2d 545 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953) ; Vanzant v. Morgan, 181 So. 660
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1938); Gulf Refining Co. v. Evans, 181 So. 666 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1938).
29. See, e.g., Watson v. Bethany, 209 La. 989, 26 So. 2d 12 (1946) ; Succes-
sion of Hollander, 208 La. 1038, 24 So. 2d 69 (1945); Snoddy v. Brashear, 13
La. Ann. 469 (1858) ; McDonough v. Tregre, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 68 (La. 1828).
30. Schoppel v. Daly, 112 La. 201, 36 So. 322 (1904) ; Hill v. Traveler's Ins.
Co., 128 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Green v. Southern Furniture
Co., 94 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Prudhomme v. Berry, 69 So. 2d 620
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1953); Duplain v. Wiltz, 194 So. 60 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1940). This rule may be inapplicable to mineral leases; however, this question
is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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ause of action against the lessor' under article 2695 of the
Code, as her husband does, but can only recover from the owner
of the premises81 by proving that the owner neglected to repair
the premises and that she was injured by "ruin 8 2 or "falling
down '88 of the building.
When considering the prenuptial debts of the husband, the
courts have said that article 2403 must be read with article
2404.34 In effect, the husband may pay his separate creditors
with community funds, while the wife does not have the same
privilege.35 However, on dissolution of the community, his es-
tate is indebted to the wife's estate for one-half of the commu-
nity funds used to liquidate his debts.86 The husband's creditors
may still be able to seize community property in satisfaction
of his separate debts,8 7 although a recent decision casts doubt
on this procedure.
88
Obviously the wife has little or no control over the commu-
nity during its existence. Administration and control, however,
31. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2695 (1870) : "The lessor guarantees the lessee
against all the vices and defects of the thing . . . and if any loss should result
to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify
him for the same." This article has been restricted to a lessee's action against
the lessor, thus excluding third persons who were injured on the premises. in
Green v. Southern Furniture Co., 94 So. 2d 508, 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957)
the court asserted: "The lessor's liability under the former codal articles [2693
and 2695] has been held to be only to the tenant and not to third persons (not
even to the tenant's wife)." Additionally, the lessor is strictly liable for the
lessee's personal injuries sustained on the premises. See Comment, 20 LA. L.
REV. 76, 77 (1959). Consequently, since the wife is a third person and cannot
use article 2695 against the lessor, her only recourse is against the owner of
the property. Of course, the lessor and owner are frequently the same person,
yet the wife must still base her cause of action on provisions other than 2695.
See Comment, 20 LA. L. REV. 76, 79 (1959).
32. LA. CmiL CODE art. 2322 (1870).
33. Id. art. 670.
34. See, e.g., Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858).
35. Succession of Rateliff, 209 La. 224, 24 So. 2d 456 (1946) ; Hawley v.
Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874); Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann.
396 (1858) ; Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611 (1848); Harris v. Harris, 160
So. 2d 359 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Stafford v. Sumrall, 21 So. 2d 83 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1945); Comment, 22 Tim. L. REv. 486, 488 (1948). But see
Notes, 21 TuL. L. REV. 125 (1946), 20 Tv. L. REV. 136 (1945). It should be
noted that "separate" debts, in the text, include the husband's prenuptial debts
as well as his separate debts incurred during the community.
36. Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611 (1.848) ; Comment, 22 TUL. L. REV. 486,
488 (1948).
37. See note 35 supra.
38. Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 526, 76 So. 2d 713, 717 (1954). The
court indicates that only the husband's one-half of the community may be
seized to satisfy his anterior debts. Speaking of the husband's prenuptial debt,
the court states: "(T]hat obligation is nonetheless enforcible from the husband's
share of the community." (Emphasis added.)
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are not the sole factors for consideration in the search for a
satisfactory determination of her interest in the community.
Second, one of the strongest arguments against the owner-
ship theory appears to be article 2410 of the Civil Code, which
allows the wife to absolve herself from liability for community
debts by renouncing the community. 9 Although renunciation
prevents the wife from receiving her share of community assets,
it also has the effect of exonerating her from any personal lia-
bility for community debts. Article 2410 is particularly ad-
vantageous to the wife who recognizes that the community debts
exceed the assets. The husband never has the privilege of re-
nunciation :40 he is always personally liable for community
debts. 41 Apparently the husband is denied the power to renounce
the community because of his control over community property.
Allied with article 2410 is R.S. 9:2821 which allows the wife
to accept the community with benefit of inventory. 42 This privi-
lege entitles the wife to receive one-half of any community as-
sets remaining after all community debts have been paid. 43 At
this point, an opportunity for speculation arises. Is the wife's
privilege of renunciation after dissolution of the community
consistent with the theory that she owns one-half of the com-
munity during its existence? An affirmative answer to this
39. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2410 (1870) : "Both the wife and her heirs or as-
signs have the privilege of being able to exonerate themselves from the debts
contracted during the marriage, by renouncing the partnership or community of
gains."
40. Succession of Baum, 11 Rob. 314 (La. 1845).
41. Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 223 La. 504, 66 So. 2d
317 (1953); Poindexter v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 170 La. 521, 128 So. 297
(1930) ; Gosserand v. Monteleone, 164 La. 397, 113 So. 889 (1927); Luthy v.
Werlein, 163 La. 752, 112 So. 709 (1927); Landreaux v. Louque, 43 La. Ann.
234 (1891) ; Succession of Cason, 32 La. Ann. 790 (1880) R icker v. Heirs of
Pearson, 26 La. Ann. 391 (1874) ; Riley v. Condran, 26 La. Ann. 294 (1874);
Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874) ; Succession of McClean,
12 La. Ann. 222 (1857) ; Scanlan v. Warwick, 10 La. Ann. 30 (1855) ; Lawson
v. Ripley, 17 La. 238 (1841) ; Breaux v. Decuir, 49 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1950) ; Ward v. Trimble, 20 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) ; Fairbanks,
Morse & Co. v. Bordelon, 198 So. 391 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940) ; Beal v. Ward,
127 So. 423 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
42. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950) : "At the dissolution for any cause of the mar-
riage community, the wife may accept the community of acquets and gains under
the benefit of inventory, in the same manner and with the same benefits and
advantages as are allowed heirs to accept a succession under the benefit of
inventory."
43. Ibid. See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1032 (1870) : "The benefit of inven-
tory is the privilege, which the heir obtains, of being liable for the charges and
debts of the succession only to the value of the effects of the succession, by
causing an inventory of these effects to be made within the time and in the man-
ner hereinafter prescribed."
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question seems doubtful, since an owner's entire patrimony is
burdened by the debts he incurs.
Third, article 2406 of the Civil Code states that "the effects
which compose the partnership or community of gains, are di-
vided into two equal portions between the husband and wife, or
between their heirs, at the dissolution of the marriage."" (Em-
phasis added.) Although it seems that article 2406 merely pro-
vides for division of community property into halves after the
community has been dissolved, the article has frequently been
used to support the proposition that the wife's interest does not
vest, or begin, until dissolution of the community. 45 Similarly,
article 2407 provides: "The fruits ... at the time of the dissolu-
tion of the marriage, are equally divided between the husband
and the wife or their heirs. ' 4 6 (Emphasis added.)
Ownership Theory
The courts have experienced difficulty in finding affirma-
tive statutory language to support the proposition that the wife
owns one-half of the community during its existence. Jurists
have occasionally relied upon article 2399 of the Civil Code
which provides that "every marriage contracted in this state,
superinduces of right partnership or community of acquets or
gains. '4T The term "community" and "partnership" are used
synonymously throughout the Code. 48 In addition, several ar-
ticles describe the community property as "common" effects or
44. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2406 (1870).
45. In Monk v. Monk, 243 La. 429, 440, 144 So. 2d 384, 388 (1962) the court
stated: "[A]nd . . . when the community was dissolved by the judgment of sep-
aration in 1939, the plaintiff, on that day, became an owner of an undivided
half interest in and to this property. Article 2406 of the Revised Civil Code."
See, e.g., Iumphreys v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949) ; Tugwell v.
Tugwell, 32 La. Ann. 848 (1880). In Commissioners of Exchange & Banking
Co. v. Bein, 12 Rob. 578, 582 (La. 1846), the court declared: "Her interest in
the community is only eventual and contingent, and is to be ascertained upon
its dissolution; it is only then that she becomes entitled to one-half of the prop-
erty . . . (Civ. Code, arts. 2375, 2378)." Article 2375 of the 1825 Code is article
2406 of the 1870 Code. 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL AaciIv s, COMPILED EDITION OF
THE CIvIL. CODES OF LOUISIANA 1323 (1942). See also Speights v. Nance, 142
So. 2d 418 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
46. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2407 (1870).
47. Id. art. 2.399. See Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d
169 (1956) ; Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188 (1932). In Beatty v. Vining,
147 So. 2d 37, 43 (la. App. 2d Cir. 1962), the court cited article 2399 and'de-
clared:. "The law's investiture of the husband as head and master of the com
munity by no means negatives or limits the wife's interest as a co-owner, or
affects her title to ah undivided one-half interest in all community property
from the. very moment of its acquisition. LSA-C.C. Arts. 2,399, 2402P" .
48. *LA CIVIL CODE art. 2332 (1870) states: '[T]he partnership, or. com-
munity of acquets or gains. . . ." See, e.g., id. arts. 2399, 2402, 2403, 2404.1 .;.:
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property.4 9. , However, article 2807 unequivocally states that. "the
community of property created by marriage is not :a partner-
ship.' 50 Similarly, to say the community is analogous to a part-
ne rship is somewhat confusing.51  To analogize the community
to' acommon law partnership would be consistent since the part-
n'rs are generally considered co-owners of the partnership
pl!0perty.52 On the other hand, Louisiana has embraced the civil
law concept of partnership, which, regarded as a separate legal
entity, owns the property while the partners have merely a "re-
'8idtary" interest.53 Accordingly, it seems inappropriate for the
advocates of the ownership approach to analogize the commu-
nity to a Louisiana partnership.
, ... Other than the above-mentioned language, the search for
affirmative statements indicating the wife is an owner during
the community has been unproductive. Rather than rely on such
paucity of language, the limitations placed by the Code upon the
husband's control and management of the community have fre-
quently been used to rebut the expectancy theory.5 4 The rea-
soning seems to be that since the husband's control of the com-
munity is restricted for the purpose of protecting the wife's
49. See, e.g., id. arts. 2334, 2404, 2405.
50. Id. art. 2807. It should be noted that article 2807 is found in the section
of the Civil Code which deals specifically with partnership.
51. However, such an analogy has been made on several occasions. See Mes-
sersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, .86 So. 2d 169 (1956). In Succession of
Wiener, 203 La. 649, 657, 14 So. 2d 475, 477 (1943), the court stated: "That
this community is a partnership in which the husband and wife own equal shares,
their title thereto vesting at the very instant such property is acquired, is well
settled in this state."
i : 52. See generally O'Neal, An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law. of Partnership,
Part II; 9 LA. L. REV. 450 (1949).
i 53. Ibid.
1i54. The Code limitations on the husband's control of the community were re-
sponsible for the birth of the ownership doctrine. Dixon v. Dixon's Executors,
4 La. 188, 192 (1832). The court, recognizing that the expectancy theory was
,the majority position in France, distinguished the French Code from the Louisi-
ana Civil Code. "The Napoleon Code does not contain the provision found in the
Code of Louisiana, that if the husband alienates, during coverture, the acquets
and gains, with the intention of injuring the wife, she may, at his decease, bring
an action to set aside the alienation. The laws of Spain seem to have furnished
that doctrine to the jurisconsults who prepared our Code. And the exercise of
such a right, does appear to us utterly opposed to the principle, that the wife
has no interest in the property until the community is dissolved; for if she has
ilot, how can she maintain an action to. set aside the alienation?" The court was
referring to LA. CIVIL' CODE p. 336, art. 66 (1808) and LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2373
(1825), which now appears as LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870). 3 LOUISIANA
LEGAL ARCiiIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LoUISIANA 1321
(1942). Louisiana courts have relied on the Dixon holding as authority for the
ownership theory. See, e.g., Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 120 So. 2d 485 (1960),;
Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956) ; Succession of
l-elis, 226 La. 133, 75 So. 2d 221 (1954); Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107
So. 584: (1926). : .I . . a: .
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interest, the conclusion is inescapable that the wife's ,interest
manifests 'itself as ownership rather than a mere benefit of sur-
vivorship. Article 2404 is one ,of the most significant statutory
limitations on the husband's control: it gives the wife a cause
of action against the heirs of the husband if he has disposed of
community property "by fraud, to injure his wife."55 The same
article prohibits the husband from donating community immov-
ables. The courts have extended the wife's cause of action for
fraudulent alienation to make it effective against her husband
when the community is dissolved by means other than his
death. 58 Article 2425 allows the wife an action for separation
of property during the marriage. 57 Article 2334 adds that where
title to community property is in the wife's name, "it cannot
be mortgaged or sold by the husband without her written au-
thority or consent."5 8 A recent amendment to article 2334 pro-
hibits the husband from alienating community immovables
without the wife's consent where the husband and wife are
named jointly as owners and the wife has filed a declaration
stating that her consent is necessary before the husband can
lease, sell, or mortgage the property.59 R.S. 9:2801-2804 forbids
the husband to sell or mortgage the family home if a declara-
tion of homestead has been filed, either by husband or wife.60
In order to enforce R.S. 9:2801, the courts have given the wife
the right to enjoin or annul, during the community, the sale or
55. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
56. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956)'; Oliphint v. Oli-
phint, 219 La. 781, 54 So. 2d 18 (1951) ; Van Asselberg v. Van Asselberg, 164
La. 553, 114 So. 155 (1927) ; Smallwood v. Pratt, 3 Rob. 132 (La. 1842).
57. LA . CIVIL CODE art. 2425 (1870): "The wife may, during the 'marriage,
petition against the husband for a separation of property, whenever her dowry
is in danger, owing to the mismanagement of her husband, or otherwise, or when
the disorder of his affairs'induces her to believe that his estate may not be suf-
ficient to meet her rights and claims."
Article 2425 does not seem to cover the situation in which the wife has brought
nothing into the marriage but is earning wages which fall into the community
and are being mismanaged by the husband. However, Davock v. Darcy, 6 Rob.
342 (La. 1844) extended article 2425'to cover such a situation.
58. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870). At the same time, the wife cannot en-
cumber community property where title stands in her name without the authority
of her husband. Bywater v. Enderle, 175 La. 1098, 145 So. 118 (1932).
, 59.'In 1962,, LA. CIVIL'CODE art. 2334 (1870) was amended to read in part:
"Where the title to immovable property stands in the names of both the husband
and wife, it may not be leased, mortgaged or sold by the husband without the
wife's Written authority or consent where she has made a declaration by authentic
act that her authority and consent are required for such lease, sale or mortgage
and'has filed such declaration in the mortgage and conveyance records of the
parish in which the property is situated."
• If she does not. file the declaration, the husband may alienate the property
Without her consent. See Young v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 184 La. 460, 166
So. 139 R(1.936). 2 (1950Y.60. LA. R.S. 9:2801-2804 (1950)O .. :'- • ,
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mortgage of the family home by the husband if a declaration
has been filed.," Finally, article 150 prohibits the husband from
contracting community debts after an action for separation
from bed and board has been filed.
2
Irrespective of the statutory provisions limiting the hus-
band's control of the community, there appear to be more con-
vincing reasons for holding that the wife's interest is greater
than a mere hope. The Code, in certain cases, requires the wife
to contribute to the community. Her "earnings," when living
with her husband, fall into the community fund.63 Similarly,
unless she files a declaration of paraphernality, "the fruits" of
her paraphernal property are deemed community property.
6 4
Article 2402 creates the all-important presumption that every-
thing, the spouses "acquire" during the community becomes
community property.6 5 Additionally, article 2402 provides that
"the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both hus-
band and wife" inures to the community. Since the wife is re-
quired to contribute to the community fund, it seems inequitable
to say her interest during the marriage amounts to only a hope
of ownership after the community has been dissolved. It should
also be noted that articles 915 and 916 allow the wife to provide
for the disposal of her one-half of the community by will, prior
to the dissolution of the community. However, it is questionable
whether 915 and 916 should be used as authority for the propo-
sition that the wife owns one-half of the community during its
existence.6 6
61. See, e.g., Reymond v. Louisiana Trust & Savings Bank, 177 La. 409, 148
So. 663 (1933).
62. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 150 (1870) : "From the day on which the action of
separation shall be brought, it shall not be lawful for the husband to contract any
debt on account of the community.
63. Id. art. 2334.
64. Id. art. 2386.
65. Id. art. 2402.
66. Id. arts. 915, 916. Although the wife is allowed to dispose of her one-half
of the community property by will, the will is not effective until dissolution of
the community and the death of the wife. Her share of the community property
on dissolution of the community will fall into her succession.. If there is no com-
munity property at dissolution of the community, the disposition of her share
by will, which was made during the existence of the community, will have no
effect. Articles 915 and 916 merely provide the wife with a means to dispose
of her share of the community property after the community has been dissolved.
Additionally, the nature of the spouses' (or former spouses') interest after dis-
solution of the community is considered to be co-ownership. See, e.g., Rhodes v.
Rhodes, 190 La. 370, 182 So. 541 (1938); Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. .123, 139
So. 901 (1932) ; Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App., 4th Cir.
1964). For this reason, it is doubtful whether articles 915 and 916 should be
used as authority for the proposition that the wife owns one-half of: the com-
munity during the existence of the community.
[Vol. XXV
COMMENTS
° After examining the statutory provisions pertinent to the
study of the wife's interest, it appears doubtful that they pro-
vide a conclusive solution to the problem. It seems improper to
say the wife has merely a hope of becoming an owner simply
because the husband is the "head and master." Similarly, it
seems 'equally unsound to use the limitations placed on the hus-
band's control of the community as the basis for declaring the
wife an owner during its existence. More conclusive results are
to be found by an examination of the jurisprudential use and
interpretations of the statutory provisions as well as the jurists'
considerations on policy matters.
JURISPRUDENCE
Origin
Dixon v. Dixon's Executors6 7 seems to be the source of the
ownership theory in Louisiana jurisprudence. The court held
that the wife's interest did not vest, or begin, at dissolution of
the community, but that "she has rights in the acquets before
the husband dies. e6  The court reasoned that since the marriage
had "superinduced of right" the community,69 and since the wife
had an action for fraudulent alienation of community property
by the husband, her rights must vest prior to dissolution.70
Before the Dixon ruling had an opportunity to become firm-
ly established in Louisiana jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
reversed its position in the landmark case of Guice v. Law-
rence.71 The husband, deeply indebted to his separate creditors
67. 4 La. 188 (1832). Husband and wife were married in Pennsylvania, but
the husband later moved to Louisiana. The husband died in Louisiana and the
widow was claiming her one-half of the community. Prior to the husband's death,
Spanish laws regarding the community were repealed. Heretofore, Spanish law
bad been relied upon heavily by the courts. The court was faced with the ques-
tion of whether to give retroactive effect to the repeal of the Spanish laws which
would abrogate the community and defeat the contentions of the widow. The
widow asserted that the law in force at the time the community was created
should, govern. and not the law in existence, at the time of dissolution.
68. Id. at 194.
69. Id. at 191: "The rights of husband and wife, in the partnership of gains,
grow out of the marriage contract, and do not originate in its dissolution. . . . If,
therefore, by the law of the country where the marriage took place, a community
of acquets and gains was declared to be created by the marriage, or, in the lan-
guage of our code, superinduced of right by the contract, we should think that
a subsequent law, declaring there should be no further community between the
persons who had entered into this engagement, would be retrospective, and as
much a violation of rights vested under the contract, as a statute would be, which
would alter the obligations imposed, or impair the rights acquired, under a con-
tract of sale or of lease."
70. See quotation from Dixon in note 54 supra.
71. 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847).
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for debts contracted prior to the marriage, voluntarily surren-
dered community immovables to satisfy his anterior debts.
After the husband died, the widow sued to be recognized as own-
er of one-half of the proceeds remaining from the sale of the
surrendered property after payment of community debts. In
ruling against the wife, the court reasoned that the voluntary
surrender of community property was merely an alienation by
the husband which he had the power to make as "head and mas-
ter" of the community. In rejecting the ownership doctrine, the
court asserted that "the laws of Louisiana have never recog-
nized a title in the wife during marriage to one-half the acquets
and gains. '72 The court supported its position by quoting a pas-
sage from the Spanish commentator, Febrero, which has since
been the subject of considerable controversy. 73 In conclusion,
the court maintained that the wife's cause of action for her hus-
band's fraudulent alienation of community property "cannot be
construed as giving or recognizing a title to or in the wife.
'74
Therefore, since the husband controls the community and since
the wife has no title therein until dissolution, the court allowed
the husband to surrender community property during the exis-
tence of the community to satisfy his personal debts.75 The
Guice v. Lawrence ruling that the wife's ownership does not
vest, or begin, until dissolution of the community was adhered
72. Id. at 228.
73. Ibid. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813,
107 So. 584 (1926), asserted that Febrero was mistranslated in Guice v. Law-
rence. In Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226, 228 (1847) the court stated: "The
rule of the Spanish law on that subject, is laid down by Febrero with his usual
precision. The ownership of the wife, says that author, is revocable and fictitious
during marriage. As long as the husband lives and marriage is not dissolved, the
wife must not say that she has gananciales, nor is she to prevent the husband
from using them, under the pretext that the law gives her one-half. But soluto
matrimonio, she becomes irrevocably the owner of one undivided half, in the
manner provided by law for ordinary joint ownership. The husband is, during
marriage, real y verdadero dueno de todos, y tiene en el efecto de s dominio,
irrevocable." Concerning the above quotation, Phillips stated: "The statement to
the contrary in Guice v. Lawrence was an error, resulting from a wrong trans-
lation of the Spanish word dom'nio, used by the commentator, Febrero. He used
the word dominio as meaning dominion or control, but not ownership, in describ-
ing the authority of the husband over the community estate." Id. at 826, 107
So. at 588.
74. Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226, 228 (1847). At the time of the in-
stant case, the proviso giving the wife an action against the heirs of her husband
for his fraudulent alienation of community property was part of article 2373 of
the 1825 Code. The proviso is now part of article 2404 of the 1870 Code. 3 Lou-
ISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA
1321 (1942).
75. Irrespective of later developments concerning the wife's interest, the hus-
band may still pay his separate debts with community funds. See note 35 supra.
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to, with :few exceptions, 76 for more than three-quarters of a
century.
77
CAUSE FOR A CHANGE - TAx PROBLEMS
In 1913, the United States Constitution was amended in
order to give Congress power to levy a federal income tax with-
out requiring apportionment among the states in proportion to
population.7 8 Subsequent thereto, federal income tax laws were
enacted-which based the tax on the "individual's" income. The
wife's earnings were to be reported separately from her hus-
bands.7 9  It became apparent that this type of tax law could
prove extremely beneficial to taxpayers in community property
states. If the wife owned one-half of the community during its
existence, she would be able to declare one-half of its annual in-
come in her separate return while her husband could declare
the remaining one-half. On the other hand, if she had only an
expectancy, the husband would have to report the entire com-
munity income in his return, thus causing a larger tax burden.
In response to a request by the Secretary of the Treasury, the
United States Attorney General issued an opinion on the mat-
ter. ° In Louisiana, Attorney General Palmer concluded that
the wife could be considered an owner of one-half of the com-
munity, therefore, she could report one-half of the community
76. In Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926), the court asserted
that Beck v. Natalie Oil Co., 143 La. 153, 78 So. 430 (1918) ; Succession of May,
120 La. 692, 45 So. 551 (1908) ; and Succession of Marsal, 118 La. 212, 42 Sq.
(1907), had overruled the Guice decision. After an examination of these cases, it
appears doubtful whether the above cited cases did, in effect, overrule Guice ,v.
Lawrence.
77. See Ramsey v. Beck, 151 La. 190, 91 So. 674 (1922) ; Jacob v. Falgoust,
150 La. 21, 90 So. 426 (1922); Succession of McCloskey, 144 La. 438, 80 So.
650 (1919) ; Succession of Emonot, 109 La. 359, 33 So. 368 (1902) ; Succession
of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411 (1890) ; Smith v. Reddick, 42 La. Ann. 1055
(1890); McCaffrey v. Benson, 40 La. Ann. 10 (1888); Bartoli v. Huguenard
39 La. Ann. 411 (1887) ; Succession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506 (1884) ; Belden
v. Hanlon, 32 La. Ann. 85 (1880) (overruled by later decision concerning other
issues) ; Succession of Cason, 32 La. Ann. 790 (1880) ; Tugwell v. Tugwell, 32
La. Ann. 848 (1880) ; Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874) ;
Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858); Snoddy v. Brashear, 13 La. Ann.
469 (1858) ; Succession of McLean, 12 La. Ann. 222 (1857).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI: "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
. 79. Numerous federal income tax laws were passed from 1913 to 1928; but
all included• language basing the tax on the individual's income. Typical is the
1919 -Revenue Act, 40 Stat. 1065 (1919), which provided that the individual's
taxable gross income would include "gains, profits, and income derived from sal-
aries, wages, or compensation for personal service . . . or growing out of the
ownership or use.of or interest in such. property.'" (Emphasis added.)
80. 32 Ops. AVr'y GEN. OF U.S. 435 (1921).
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income.8 ' His conclusion was based on the code provisions lima
iting the husband's control of community property as well as
articles 915 and 916 of the Code, which allow the wife to dis-
pose of one-half of the community property by will. 2 The pro-
visions supporting the expectancy theory were, on the other
hand, regarded lightly, and the Attorney General merely al-
luded to the fact that the preponderance of jurisprudence fa-
vored the expectancy approach.8 3 In any event, the opinion
enabled the people of Louisiana and other community property
states to benefit from the early federal income tax laws.
On January 4, 1926, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided the landmark case of United States v. Robbins.84 Although
the decision was limited to California law, the result caused
much consternation among taxpayers of all community prop-
erty states.8 5 The Court held that the wife's interest was a mere
expectancy and, therefore, she could not report one-half of the
community income in her separate return. More significantly,
Justice Holmes indicated, in dictum, that ownership was not
the proper test for determining whether the wife was entitled
to report one-half of the community income. He asserted that
the husband's control of the community was sufficient to re-
quire him to report the entire annual community income.86
The impact of the Robbins case necessitated expeditious de-
cisions on the matter. It was apparent that the nature of the
wife's interest was once again an unsettled question. Was she
an owner or did she have a mere expectancy? More significant-
ly, was ownership by the wife sufficient or would the husband's
control of the community require him to report the entire com-
munity income? Three weeks after Robbins, the Attorney Gen-
eral announced that he was considering the problem of the
wife's interest and the effect of the Holmes dictum. He invited
the filing of briefs and granted a hearing for the states to pre-
sent their arguments.8 7 The situation looked bleak for the peo-
81. Id. at 460.
82. Id* at 444' 460.' But see note 66 supra.
83. Id. at 445.
84. 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
85. See Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest
in Community Property-A Comparative Study, 19 CALIF. L. REY. 567, 574
(1931) ; Donworth, Federal Taxation of Community Incomes- The Recent Hi8-
tory of Pending Questions, 4 WASH. L. REa. 145, 157 (1929).
86. United States v. Robbinsi 269 U.S. 315, 327 (1926).
87. Donwortb, Federal Taxation of Community Incomes - The Recent History
of. Pending Questions, 4 WAsIt. L. REV. 145, 163 (1929).
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pie of Louisiana since our jurisprudence was heavily weighted
in favor of Guice v. Lawrence, or the expectancy ruling." The
urgent need for persuasive jurisprudence holding that the wife
owned one-half of the community during its existence became
apparent. Shortly thereafter, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Phillips v. Phillips,"9 by way of dicta, expressed disapproval of
Guice and announced that the wife held title to one-half of the
community prior to dissolution. The court's principal concern
was whether act 4 of 1882 (now R.S. 9:2821) repealed article
2420.9 Article 2420 stipulated, in effect, that when the commu-
nity was dissolved by a separation from bed and board, the wife
was presumed to renounce the community unless she formally
accepted within thirty days.91 R.S. 9:2821 allows the wife to
accept the community under benefit of inventory with the "same
benefits and advantages as are allowed heirs to accept a suc-
cession under the benefit of inventory." 92 Therefore, the wife
separated from her husband by divorce, separation from bed and
board, or death had the same rights regarding the community
as did an heir to a succession. She could either accept uncondi-
tionally,93 renounce 9 4 or accept with benefit of inventory25
However, while the wife was presumed to renounce the commu-
nity under article 2420, an heir was not presumed to renounce
the succession nor was a widow presumed to renounce the com-
munity s After a thirty-day deliberation period,97 they could
merely be compelled to choose whether to accept or renounce.9 8
The court reasoned that the obligations article 2420 imposed
upon the separated or divorced wife were incongruous with the
88. See note 77 supra.
89. 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
90. Ibid. The wife had obtained a separation from bed and board but did not
formally accept the community within 30 days from dissolution as was required
by article 2420. Eight months later, she sued for partition and settlement of the
community. If Act 4 of 1882 repealed article 2420, she could validly sue for
partition of the community after 30 days had expired. If article 2420 was still
in effect, she would .be considered as having tacitly renounced the community
since she did not formally accept within 30 days after the community had been
dissolved.
91. LA. CIVIL CoD art. 2420 (1870): "The wife, separated from bed and
board, 'vho has not within the delays above fixed, to begin from the separation
finally pronounced, accepted the community, is supposed to have renounced the
same .... (Repealed by La. Acts 1926, No. 49.)."
92. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950).
93. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2409 (1870).
94. Id. art. 2410.
95. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950).
96. Schreiber v. Beer's Widow & Heirs, 150 La. 676, 91 So. 149 (1922)
Edwards v. Ricks, 30 La. Ann. 926 (1878).
97. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1050 (1870).
98. Id. arts. 1055, 2414.
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advantages given her by R.S. 9:2821. However, after conclud-
ing that R.S. 9:2821 had, in effect, repealed article 2420, the
court continued by examining the nature of the wife's interest:
'The wife's half interest in the community property is not a
mere expectancy during the marriage; it is not transmitted to
her by or in consequence of a dissolution of the community. The
title for half of the community property is vested in the wife the
moment it is acquired." 99 It would be inconsistent for the wife
to tacitly renounce the community after thirty days have passed,
reasoned Justice O'Niell, since she owns one-half of the com-
munity during its existence. 100 The reasoning of the court raises
several questions. Unquestionably, an heir's right to his an-
cestor's patrimony does not arise until death of the ancestor. 1' 1
Thus, prior to that time, his interest is not considered as owner-
ship in any form. He has no control over his ancestor's patri-
mony and does not consent to the obligations of his ancestor.
Apparently, for this reason, the heir is given the privilege of
exonerating himself from liability if the debts of the succession
exceed the assets. He may deliberate10 2 on whether to re-
nounce,10 3 accept unconditionally,0 4 or accept the succession with
benefit of inventory.10 The heir is certainly not given the op-
portunity to renounce something which he previously owned.
In the same manner as an heir, the wife may deliberate' 6 on
whether to renounce,'10 7 accept unconditionally, 0 8 or accept the
community with benefit of inventory. 10 9 Similarly, the wife has
almost as little control over the community during its existence
as doe's the heir over his ancestor's patrimony prior to death." 0
Despite this lack of control, the wife is still said to own one-half
of the community during its existence."' If so, why is she given
a deliberation period? More significantly, why may she choose
to renounce what she previously owned? Irrespective of the
court's reasoning, the Phillips decision provided the ammuni-
99. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 825, 107 So. 584, 588 (1926).
100. Ibid.
101. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 940-942 (1870).
102. Id. arts. 1033, 1050.
103. Id. art. 1014.
104. Id. art. 977.
105. Id. art. 1032.
106. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
107. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2410 (1870).
108. Id. art. 2409.
109. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950).
110. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
111. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
[Vol. XXV
COMMENTS
tion'Louisiana needed when the inevitable tax contest arose.
Aside from the consternation among taxpayers in the com-
munity property states, the Robbins decision precipitated two
other significant events. First, Congress enacted section 1212
of the Revenue Act of 1926 which temporarily disposed of the
possibility of tax liability as a result of the husband's control
of the community. 112 Section 1212 provided that if the wife had
a "vested" interest, as opposed to an expectancy, separate. re-
turns filed prior to January 1, 1925, would be considered as
correctly returned.13 The section made no provisions for the
future but merely protected the taxpayer against an action for
back taxes prior to 1925."1 For the future, the 1926 act em-
bodied the provisions of the former acts which based the tax on
the "individual's" income." 5 Second, the Robbins decision even-
tually led to the institution of test suits in all community prop-
erty states, except California, in order that a final decision
could be made regarding the rights of the husband and wife to
file separate returns.1 1 6 In 1927, the Secretary of the Treasury
requested an opinion from the Attorney General as to the status
of the law in the community property states regarding the wife's
interest. After much deliberation, the Attorney General decided
against an administrative decision on the matter, suggesting
that the question of the wife's interest should be decided by the
courts." 7 In view of the differences in the various community
property systems, he recommended that the federal courts ac-
cept the decisions of the state courts on the matter of the wife's
interest.118 His proposal led the way to the Louisiana test case
of Bender v. Pfaff."9 The United States Supreme Court adopt-
112. Donworth, Federal Taxation of Community Incomes -The Recent His-
tory of Pending Questions, 4 WASH. L. REV. 145, 162 (1929).
113. Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 130 (1927). Section 1212 provided:
"Income for any period before January 1, 1925, of a marital community in the
income of which the wife has a vested interest as distinguished from an e.r-
pectancy, shall be held to be correctly returned if returned by the spouse to whom
the income belonged under the state law applicable to such marital community
for such period." (Emphasis added.)
114. 35 Ops. AT'VY GEN. OF U.S. 265, 268 (1929).
115. Revenue Act of 1926, § 213, 44 Stat. 9, 23 (1927).
116. Donworth, Federal Taxation of Community Incomes - The Recent His-
tory of Pending Questions, 4 WASH. L. REV. 145, 163 (1927).
117. 35 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. OF U.S. 265 (1925), rendered July 16, 1927.
118. Id. at 266: "The nature and extent of a wife's interest in community
income . . . is to be determined from the statutes and decisions of the State. In
determining the nature of an interest in community income created by State law,
it is necessary for the Federal courts to accept the decisions of the State courts."
119. 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
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ed, almost verbatim, the language of the Phillips case in holding
that the wife was owner of one-half of the community during
its existence. Accordingly, the people of Louisiana continued
to benefit from the existing tax laws.
Inheritance taxes caused a similar controversy in 1942.120
Section 402 (b) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1942, amending the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, provided for taxation of commu-
nity property to "the extent of the interest therein held as com-
munity property by the decedent and surviving spouse." 121 In
other words, the deceased's heirs were to be taxed on the worth
of the total community and not simply the ancestor's one-half
interest. Prior to 1942, only the deceased's one-half of the com-
munity was included in the gross estate. 122 Almost immediately
after passage, the constitutionality of the amendment was test-
ed. In Succession of Wiener,123 the state tax collector alleged
that all community property should be included in the gross
estate of the deceased. The collector, because of section
402(b) (2), was attempting to place a similar construction on
an earlier Louisiana law. 124 In other words, if the collector was
successful, the wife's one-half of the community would be in-
cluded within the gross estate of the deceased husband. The
heirs contended that enforcement of the state and federal laws
would be a denial of due process of law and the Louisiana Su-
preme Court agreed. The court, citing Phillips and Pfaff, held
that since the wife owned one-half of the community during
existence, the inclusion of her one-half in the gross estate of the
deceased was a violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.1 25 In denying jurisdiction, the United States Supreme
Court circumvented the challenge by ruling that the decision
was based on Louisiana law and not on section 402(b) (2) .126
Undoubtedly, the Phillips and Wiener rulings were benefi-
cial to the people of Louisiana. At the time, there was a defi-
120. See generally Jackson, Taxation of Community Property: The WIENER
Case, 18 TuL. L. REv. 525 (1944).
121. Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 942 (1943). This became Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 811(e) (2).
122. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811 (a) which is the same as INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 2033: "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of
his death."
123. 203 La. 649, 14 So. 2d 475 (1943).
124. See Jackson, Taxation of Community Property: The WIENER Case, 18
TUL. L. REv. 525, 538 (1944).
125. Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 658, 662, 14 So. 2d 475, 478, 481
(1943).
126. Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 (1944).
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nite need for these decisions. However, the need for treating
the wife as an owner, for taxation purposes, has passed. The
offending provision of the 1942 Revenue Act was repealed in
1948. The gross estate, for inheritance tax purposes, now in-
cludes only the deceased's share of the community. 127 Similarly,
the basis for federal income taxation has been changed. Section
301 of the Revenue Act of 1948 was designed to equalize the
tax burden of married couples in community property and non-
community property states, consequently, the ownership test
was discarded. 1 28 In all states, each of the spouses is now taxed
on only one-half of the combined annual income, if a joint re-
turn is filed. 129 However, spouses in community property states
may still file separate returns for one-half of the annual com-
munity income.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE
As stated previously, prior to 1926 the preponderance of
jurisprudence favored the hope or expectancy theory,'"o but
since Phillips the courts seem to adhere to the ownership ap-
proach.' 3 ' However, recent authority supporting Guice v. Law-
rence is available. For example, in First National Bank of Ville
127. 1 CCH, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAx, 1954 Code Regulations, para.
1310.05 (1960) : "The Revenue Act of 1948 repealed all of the above provisions
relating to inclusions in the gross estate on account of interests in community
property. Its effect . . . is to restore to the residents of community property
states the same status they had before enactment of the 1942 Act as to estate tax
liability - that is, their property interests are governed by the law of the state,
and only one-half of the community property belongs to each spouse. The one-
half which belonged to the deceased spouse is includible in his (or her) gross
estate under 1954 Code sec. 2033."
128. 1 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 2.05 (1962):
"The provisions for the splitting of income between husband and wife, which
were first introduced by the Revenue Act of 1948, were designed to equalize the
tax burden of married couples in common law and in community property states."
129. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2(a) : "In the case of a joint return of a
husband and wife under section 6013, the tax imposed by section 1 shall be twice
the tax which would be imposed if the taxable income were cut in half."
130. See note 77 supra.
131. Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 155 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1946) ; First Nat'l Bank of Shreveport v. United States, 224 F. Supp.
747 (W. D. La. 1963); McCullough v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 673 (W.D.
La. 1955) ; Godchaux v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. La. 1952) ; Land
v. Acadian Prod. Corp. of La., 57 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. La. 1944) ; Azar v. Azar,
239 La. 941, 120 So. 2d 485 (1960) ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d
12 (1956); Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229. La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956);
Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954) ; Succession of Helis, 226
La. 133, 75 So. 2d 221 (1954) ; Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 14 So. 2d
475 (1943) ; Beatty v. Vining, 147 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Brous-
sard v. Broussard, 132 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Succession of Johnson,
8 So. 2d 139 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942); Smith v. Routon, 181 So. 684 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1938).
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Platte v. Coreil,'32 the court declared that "property being com-
munity, the wife had no title therein and could become half-
owner only after the dissolution of the marriage." In 1962, the
Supreme Court indicated the wife's interest was not absolute
until dissolution by) stating: "[W] hen the community was dis-
solved by judgment of separation in 1939, the plaintiff, on that
day, became an owner of an undivided half interest in and to
this property."'183 After numerous attempts to discredit the
Guice ruling, the expectancy theory, although a minority posi-




There is little affirmative statutory language to support the
ownership approach. In treating the wife as an owner prior to
dissolution of the community, the courts have found it neces-
sary to resort to statutory limitations on the husband's control
of the community to support their conclusions. The fact that
the wife is required to contribute monetarily to the community
also tends to support the ownership doctrine. However, the
bulk of authority supporting the ownership approach is to be
found in the jurisprudence. Passage of federal tax laws caused
an immediate about-face in the courts regarding the nature of
the wife's interest. Although the offensive sections of these
laws have long since been repealed, the trend of jurisprudence
initiated by their passage, remains with us.
Expectancy Theory
Statutory and jurisprudential authority for the expectancy
theory can be found in three groups. First, article 2404 of the
Civil Code gives control and administration of the community
to the husband. The Code of Civil Procedure and other later
legislation fully support article 2404. Similarly, the jurispru-
dence affirms the proposition that the husband is "head and
master" by treating the wife as a third person with respect to
132. 145 So. 395, 398 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
133. Monk v. Monk, 243 La. 429, 440, 144 So. 2d 384, 388 (1962).
134. Others have taken a contrary position. See Morrow, Matrimonial Prop-
erty Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV. 3, 17 (1959): "When property is
deemed to fall into the community, there can be no doubt whatever in Louisiana
of the nature of the interest of each spouse in it. The wife in Louisiana has,
just as the husband has, an immediate, present one-half interest, as owner, in all
community property from the time of its acquisition."
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the acts of her husband as well as allowing the husband to pay
his separate creditors with community funds. Second, article
2410 of the Code allows the wife to renounce the community,
thus absolving herself from liability for community debts.
Third, article 2406 may indicate that ownership of the spouses
does not vest, or begin, until the community has been dissolved.
Although the great weight of statutory and jurisprudential
authority has favored the Guice v. Lawrence ruling, the ex-
pectancy theory has been the minority position since 1926. Sub-
sequent to Justice O'Niell's emphatic denunciation of Guice, the
courts have clung tenaciously to the theory that the wife is an
owner during the community. Given the preponderance of re-
cent decisions following Phillips and Pfaff, it seems that the
ownership approach remains the majority view today.
PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE OWNERSHIP DOCTRINE
Parol Evidence
It has often been said that the discussion of the nature of
the wife's interest is merely academic and without practical sig-
nificance. 3 5 The inaccuracy of this statement has become ap-
parent in light of recent jurisprudence. There are in fact dis-
tinct practical consequences in treating the wife as an owner,
especially when rules of parol evidence are at issue.
Parol evidence is generally inadmissible between parties and
their privies to vary the terms of a written contract.138 Third
parties, on the other hand, are generally not bound by the parol
evidence rule.137 For the most part, the wife has been treated
135. 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 905 (1959); McKAY, COMMUNITY
PBOPERTY § 1179 (2d ed. 1925).
136. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2276 (1870) ; Templet v. Babbit, 198 La. 810,
5 So. 2d 13 (1942) ; Smith v. Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So. 242 (1933) ; Com-
mercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. White, 145 La. 54, 81 So. 753
(1919) ; Beatty v. Vining, 147 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Cahow v.
Hughes, 169 So. 801 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) ; Ewell v. Giamanco, 139 So. 515
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) ; Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427 (1941).
137. See, e.g., Henderson Iron Works & Supply v. Jeffries, 159 La. 620, 105
So. 792 (1925) ; Blake v. Hall, 19 La. Ann. 49 (1867) ; Morgan v. Livingston,
6 Mart.(O.S.) 19 (La. 1819). In other words, a third party may introduce parol
to vary the recital in a written contract. At the same time, a third person,
adversely affected, may exclude parol by a party or privy to the contract. Amite
Auto Co. v. Appel, 134 So. 332 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931) ; Hooper v. Miller, 125
So. 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929) ; Central Mfg. & Lumber Co. v. Darcantel, 2
Orl. App. 444 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1905).
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as a third person to the acts of the husband."" Although the
wife is bound by the acts of her husband as "head and master,"
she has been considered a third person until she has accepted
the community unconditionally. If she renounces, she remains
in the position of a third person, and rightly so.1' 9 It would thus
appear inconsistent to treat the wife as a privy or party to the
acts of her husband when she can exonerate herself from liabil-
ity for his actions. However, recent decisions have viewed the
matter differently. In Beatty v. Vining, 40 the court protected
the wife by allowing her to invoke the parol evidence rule
against her husband, who had attempted to introduce parol to
prove that certain property was acquired by a commercial part-
nership and not by the community. The wife objected to his use
of parol to vary the articles of partnership. In sustaining her
objection, the court reasoned that because the wife had an in-
terest in the property on acquisition, "she is, therefore, directly
concerned, interested in, and a privy to all acquisitions of prop-
erty for the community estate."' 41 The objection to the use of
parol was sustained on other grounds which would seem to make
it unnecessary for the court to declare that the wife is a privy
to all contracts of her husband concerning community prop-
erty. 42 Holding the wife is no longer a third party to the acts
138. See notes 29, 30 supra.
139. See Jacob v. Falgoust, 150 La. 21, 90 So. 426 (1922) ; Spencer v. Scott,
46 La. Ann. 1209 (1894) ;Snoddy v. Brashear, 13 La. Ann. 469 (1858) ; Brassoc
v. Ducros, 4 Rob. 335 (La. 1843) ; McDonough v. Tregre, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 68 (La.
1828).
140. 147 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
141. Id. at 44.
142. The court employed the well-known rule that parol evidence is inadmis-
sible to establish title in real estate in some person other than those named in
the conveyance. The court concluded: "Therefore, upon the authority of the
provisions of the Civil Code and under the well-established jurisprudence of this
state, plaintiff's objection to the admissibility of parol testimony, coming from
Wall and Vining and offered for the purpose of showing that Wall had acquired,
under the articles of partnership, an undivided one-half interest in and to all the
properties acquired by Vining in East Carroll Parish subsequent to the creation
of the partnership, was meritorious and well-founded and should have been, and
is now, sustained." Id. at 45.
Similarly, the court also sustained the wife's objection to use of parol by
employment of the equally well-known rule that all property acquired during the
existence of the community is presumed to be community property. LA. CivrI.
CODE art. 2402 (1870). To overcome this presumption, the husband must make
a double recital in the deed to the effect that he is purchasing the property with
his separate funds and intends for the property to become his separate property.
See, e.g., Succession of Goll, 156 La. 910, 101 So. 263 (1924). If the husband
fails to make a double recital in the deed, the property becomes community and
the husband is not allowed to introduce evidence to show otherwise. In this re-
gard the court declared: "The deeds contain no recitals to the effect that the
properties were not acquired as assets of the community of acquets and gains
existing between plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, these properties are not
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of her husband would appear to overturn considerable jurispru-
dence, the "lease" 143 cases being one example. Similarly, since
privies are bound by the acts of the parties to the contract, it
seems that such a conclusion conflicts with the statutory pro-
visions granting the wife the privilege to renounce her share of
the community.
Wife's Suit Against Husband During the Community
Another fairly recent decision, Thigpen v. Thigpen,144 sheds
further light on the practicality of treating the wife as an own-
er during the community. Article 2404 gives the wife an action
against the heirs of the husband for his fraudulent alienation
of community property. 145 This provision assumes that the wife
will have this action only when the community is dissolved by
the death of the husband. But should she not be able to sue the
husband for his fraudulent alienation of community property
when the community is dissolved by other means? The Thigpen
decision attempted to meet this problem, but the court's reason-
ing raised several unanswered questions. The court used the
ownership rule as the basis for allowing a defrauded wife to sue
her husband after the community had been dissolved by judicial
separation. The court held that since the wife was an owner
during the community, she should have a cause of action against
her husband after dissolution of the community by means other
than death.1 46 It would seem to follow that if she can sue her
husband after dissolution because she is an owner during the
community, she should be able to sue him during the community
for the same reason. However, R.S. 9:291 allows the wife to
sue her husband during marriage in only four situations, and
fraudulent alienation of community property is not included.
147
only presumed but are, so far as the wife is concerned, conclusively presumed to
be assets of the community formerly existing between her and her husband." Id.
at 43.
143. See notes 30-33 supra, and accompanying text.
144. 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956).
145. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870), in part: "But if it should be proved
that the husband has sold the common property, or otherwise disposed of the
same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have an action against the heirs of
her husband, in support of her claim in one-half of the property, on her satis-
factorily proving fraud."
146. 231 La. 206, 226, 91 So. 2d 12, 19 (1956) : "However, it has long since
been established that the wife has a vested interest in community property at the
time it is acquired. Consequently, the only logical view to be accorded Article
2404 is that it gives to the defrauded wife an action against her husband in the
event the community is dissolved by divorce or judicial separation."
147. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1963) : "As long as the marriage continues and
the spouses are not separated judicially a married woman may not sue her hus-
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In Azar v. Azar,148 the Supreme Court later rejected any possi-
bility of the wife suing her husband during the community for
fraud, pointing out that the wife could protect her community
interests during the marriage by a suit for separation of prop-
erty.
The use of the ownership doctrine as the basis for the court's
conclusion in the Thigpen case seems unnecessary. Prior juris-
prudence had previously filled the gap in our law. As early as
1842, the Supreme Court stated that "although this law seems
to contemplate only the case of a dissolution of the community
by the death of the husband, yet the wife would not, perhaps,
be without. relief, in case of a separation from bed and board,
were it proved that the husband had alienated property of the
community in fraud of her rights."' 49 Prior to the Thigpen de-
cision, the Supreme Court had frequently permitted a defrauded
wife to sue her husband after judicial separation or divorce. 0
It seems the same conclusion could have been reached by simply
adhering to the jurisprudence rather than casting doubt upon
the validity of the well-established rule which limits the wife's
power to sue her husband during marriage to the four proceed-
ings permitted by R.S. 9:291.
CONCLUSION
Although the ownership approach remains the majority
position, the question still remains: which theory best describes
the wife's interest in the community? It is submitted that
neither view accurately characterizes the nature of the wife's in-
terest in the community. Irrespective of which theory prevails,
neither approach will adequately cover all situations that may
arise. The wife's contributions to the community and the statu-
tory limitations on the husband's control of the community seem
to indicate that the wife's interest is greater than a mere hope.
On the other hand, the ownership theory is difficult to reconcile
with the wife's inability to bind the community without her
band except for: (1) A separation of property; (2) The restitution and enjoy-
ment of her paraphernal property; (3) A separation from bed and board; or
(4) A divorce."
148. 239 La. 941, 120 So. 2d 485 (1960).
149. Smallwood v. Pratt, 3 R6b. 132, 133 (La. 1842).
150. Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 54 So. 2d 18 (1951) ; Van Asselberg
v. Van Asselberg, 164 La. 553, 114 So. 155 (1927). In Frierson v. Frierson,
164 La. 687, 114 So. 594 (1927), the wife's claim against her husband was de-
feated simply because she did not allege that his actions were fraudulent.. The
court implied that she. would have been successful if. she had alleged- fraud. J -1
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husband's consent'" and with the "head and master" provision.
of article 2404. In an action involving property owned in in-
division, all those whose interests are affected by the judgment,
must be a party to the action. 5 2 Similarly, in alienation of prop-
erty, all those persons whose interests are affected must appear
in the deed. If the wife is a true co-owner, it would follow that
she would be required to be a party to all actions involving com-
munity property as well as appear in all transactions concerning
community property. It is apparent that such a conclusion con-
flicts with article 2404 of the Civil Code and article 686 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the wife's inferior powers
and rights regarding control of community property, it appears
doubtful whether she could be correctly called a co-owner.
Would it be more appropriate to label the wife a partner?
Article 2807 of the Code expressly states she is not a partner.
On dissolution of a partnership, the partners cannot choose
whether to accept or repudiate the partnership as a wife may
choose to renounce the community. 53
Will any single theory adequately describe the wife's interest
without numerous exceptions? More significantly, should we:
attempt to categorize or classify the wife's interest under. any
single theory? It is suggested that we should abstain from any
further attempts of this nature. What will be gained by
analogizing the wife's interest to co-ownership, partnership,
or the expectancy of an heir? Will categorizing the wife's in-
terest facilitate comprehension of the problem or application
of principles of law by the courts? As has been demonstrated,
the adoption of any theory will require consideration of numer-
ous exceptions to the chosen doctrine. On the subject of com-
munity property, it has been stated that any "attempt to com-
press the law into agreement with any theory is practically
certain to do violence to the law. ' 15 4 The validity of this view-
point seems to have been unquestionably proved in light of the
Beatty and Thigpen cases. After an examination of the prob-
lem, it appears that more harm than good has resulted from
attempts to categorize the wife's interest. If the lawmakers
had intended the wife to be a co-owner or partner, would they
151. There are exceptions to this rule. For example, in Thibodaux v. Richard,
60 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952), a wife was allowed to sell a cow belong-
ing to the community when the husband failed'to provide for necessaries.
152. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 640 (1960).
153. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2872-2875 (1870).
154. McKAY; COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1186 (2d ed. 1925).
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not have expressly stipulated to that effect? It is possible that
the question was left open because none of the classifications
of' ownership would adequately describe the nature of the wife's
interest in the community. It is submitted that fewer unde-
sirable results will be produced if the wife's interest is char-
acterized as the lawmakers intended it to be - sui generis.
Gordon E. Rountree
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS BY SPOUSES
During the existence of the marital community, two broad
classes of actions may arise with accompanying problems pecu-
liar to each: actions against third parties and those between the
spouses themselves. The former may be further divided into
actions which may be brought by the wife in her individual ca-
pacity and actions properly instituted by the husband individ-
ually, or as head and master of the community. In the past dif-
ficulty has arisen due to uncertainty whether certain actions
are separate or community, since choice of an improper plain-
tiff could result in dismissal for no right of action. In the area
of the wife's separate actions there has been a significant broad-
ening of the wife's capacity to sue as well as an increase in the
number of claims classified as her separate property. In the
area of interspousal suits, most problems are concerned with
the scope of the underlying policy prohibiting certain types of
suits, especially tort suits, and the breadth of the prohibition
itself. This Comment examines these problem areas.
ACTIONS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES
Wife's Separate Rights and Actions
Generally, the classification of the right sought to be en-
forced as one belonging to the community or to the separate
estate of one spouse determines the choice of a proper plaintiff.
Actions to enforce common rights usually must be instituted by
the husband as head and master of the community, whereas
each spouse may institute actions relative to his own separate
property. The husband's separate rights and actions apparently
do not present any problems, since he may personally institute
(Vol. XXV
